Will the Supreme Court upset precedent, and allow corporations to spend their profits bashing political adversaries before elections?

As far back as 1905, in an annual address, Teddy Roosevelt blasted corporate campaign contributions, asserting:

All contributions by corporations to any political committee or for any political purpose should be forbidden by law; directors should not be permitted to use stockholders' money for such purposes; and, moreover, a prohibition of this kind would be, as far as it went, an effective method of stopping the evils aimed at in corrupt practices acts. Not only should both the National and the several State Legislatures forbid any officer of a corporation from using the money of the corporation in or about any election, but they should also forbid such use of money in connection with any legislation save by the employment of counsel in public manner for distinctly legal services.

Over 65 years later, Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 ("FECA"), 2 U.S.C. 431, et seq., which prohibited unions, national banks, and corporations from making campaign contributions or expenditures. But in 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court held unconstitutional, in First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), a Massachusetts' law restricting corporate political speech (aka spending corporate money to influence voters in a referendum). The Bellotti dissent noted the disconnect with federal campaign laws, but the majority felt referendums are distinguishable from electoral campaigns.

Soon thereafter, the plaintiffs in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) challenged the constitutionality of FECA, with partial success. The Buckley court held, in essence, that money talks, and that campaign expenditures are protected by the first amendment, but not campaign contributions. Buckley made it clear, however, that expenditures by private persons cannot be limited simply by characterizing them as contributions. Despite Buckley, it remained unlawful for a corporation, national bank, or union to provide funds to a campaign. See 2 USCS 441b.

But corporations soon discovered loopholes that allowed them to support campaigns, so long as they avoided "electoral advocacy." To address this, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, ("BCRA"), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 113. Under BCRA, corporations must fund "electioneering communications" with PAC money. See 2 U.S.C. 441b. "Electioneering communications" are defined, in part, as broadcasts made within 60 days of a presidential campaign.

This long history of legislatively imposed restraints on corporate campaigning has withstood Supreme Court scrutiny in the past, including in two relatively recent cases, McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) and FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449(2007).

But then there was the so-called movie pillorying Hillary (sorry, I couldn't resist) last election, and its corporate sponsor. And now change is in the air.

This week, the Supreme Court, including for the first time Justice Sotomayor, heard, for the second time, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (08-205) (the Hillary case), which challenges restrictions on corporate campaign funding, or, depending on your viewpoint, mudslinging. To win, the plaintiffs will need to win over Roberts and Alito--in the past, Roberts has expressed some reluctance about overturning precedent.

We'll see how it goes this time round.